Extreme oppression could extinguish ontological freedom while leaving biological life

Evidence

Both Beauvoir and Sartre seem to equate human reality with ontological (or what Beauvoir sometimes calls original) freedom. Th is suggests that when a previously ontologically free being is no longer ontologically free, it cannot be human. If we suppose that certain forms of extreme oppression completely extinguish ontological (and not just merely practical) freedom without ending life, then we have to give an account of what remains and whether such a freedom-extinguished being can recuperate ontological freedom. One might begin by drawing a continuum from inert thingness to vegetative states to something like animal existence to transcendence. โ€” Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 213

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Clarifies the distinction between ontological/original freedom and merely practical freedom, and sketches what a freedom-extinguished being might be.
  • XREF: Connects to the slavery and objectification themes in A Very Minor Prophet and to the continuum of dehumanization in Parable of the Sower. โ€” connects to: Oppression functions by domesticating and submerging consciousness. โ€” Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 121; Moral blame for failing to will freedom depends on access that oppression can foreclose โ€” Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle ofโ€ฆ, 654; Oppression must be perceived as a transformable limiting situation, not a closed world. โ€” Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 116

Broader Connections