Expression alienates thought, requiring the Other’s freedom to give it meaning

Evidence

Best able to meet the demands of this predicament would be a philosophical language that would strive for intelligibility without confusing it with clarity. As an expression of the thing itself, language is not fully reducible to communication with others. Nor, however … is it simply independent of communication. Otherwise it would elude all critique, even in its relationship to the matter at hand, and would reduce that relationship to an arbitrary presumption. Language as expression of the thing itself and language as communication are interwoven. The ability to name the matter at hand is developed under the compulsion to communicate it, and that element of coercion is preserved in it; conversely, it could not communicate anything that it did not have as its own intention, undistracted by other considerations. This dialectic plays itself out within the medium of language itself; it is not merely a fall from grace on the part of an inhumane social zeal that watches to make sure that no one thinks anything that cannot be communicated. — Dirk Braunstein, Adorno’s Critique of Political Economy, 1014 (#expands, via linked claim)

Every situation exists in the world; it is not of the same order as being. It is, in fact, essentially constituted out of Others; its objectivity is conditioned by the meaning that other subjectivities cast on being. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 444 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Proving one’s alienation requires freely recognizing the Other’s freedom; The situation is constituted from Others’ meanings rather than from being itself — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 444; Philosophical language must interweave expression and communication, neither reducible to the other — Dirk Braunstein, Adorno’s Critique of Political Economy, 1014 (+4 more)

Broader Connections