Exempting newcomer Granadans from tribute made established payers refuse to pay

Evidence

This was all before the Second Granadan War. After the war, things changed because the displaced persons who arrived from Granada were not participants in the payment of the situado in their new place of residence. What is more, the Inquisition hung back from pursuing these incomers or imposing fresh vexatious charges on them. Special permission had to be secured before the Inquisition could institute action against the Granadans. (Presumably it was judged that an extra imposition might be enough to push the impoverished Granadans into rebellion, and the intention was to allow them a chance to settle into their new homes.) The local ex-Mudejars then noticed that their new neighbors from the south were paying no situado and yet were not worse treated than they were. What was the point of paying an imposition that yielded no benefits? The ex-Mudejars, the local Moriscos, therefore became reluctant to pay their own situado dues. — L. P. Harvey, Muslims in Spain, 1500 to 1614, 1123

Categorization

• XREF: A real-world instance of the public-goods free-rider problem: when the tax’s protective benefit appears not to require payment, contributors defect. Connects to the law-merchant/reputation material on when cooperative equilibria break down.