Excluded great powers can seize initiatives to force their way into settlement processes

Evidence

The need to include the Russians became clear in February 1994. Without consulting Russia, NATO issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to remove their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo or face air attacks. The Serbs resisted this demand, and a violent encounter with NATO seemed likely. Yeltsin warned that “Some people are trying to resolve the Bosnian question without the participation of Russia” and “We will not allow this.” The Russian government then seized the initiative and persuaded the Serbs to withdraw their weapons if Russia deployed peacekeeping troops to the Sarajevo area. This diplomatic coup prevented escalation of the violence, demonstrated to the West Russian clout with the Serbs, and brought Russian troops to the heart of the disputed area between Bosnian Muslims and Serbs. Through this maneuver Russia effectively established its claim to “equal partnership” with the West in dealing with Bosnia. — Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the…, 816

Categorization

• XREF: Illustrates the ‘fault line war’ diplomacy of coercing allies, connecting to Milgrom’s reputation/enforcement themes and to how credibility of kin-states operates.
• SEED: Essay angle: how a mid-tier power can convert exclusion into de facto veto power and negotiating leverage in a great-power intervention.