Evil acts demand retribution while mere wrongdoing does not

Evidence

An approach from another direction is possible. So far I have attempted to define evil as we use the concept in our everyday life. Now let me suggest a marker reaction that tells us when evil is present. Moral and jurisprudential philosophy typically identifies five reasons for incarcerating or otherwise punishing an individual who has committed wrongdoing, including (a) providing an opportunity for the correction or rehabilitation of the individual, (b) deterring that individual from future wrong acts, (c) deterring other individuals who witness the punishment, and (d) incapacitating the individual for a period to prevent the commission of other wrong actions, just as one would cage a dangerous animal. The last reason (e), which seems to me to exist on a somewhat different plane, is called “just desserts,” or closer to the bone, “retribution.” The notion here is one of lex talonis—society must punish justly an individual who commits certain sorts of wrong actions. Evil actions invariably are seen by people as requiring this last sort of punishment; mere wrongdoing does not always elicit this requirement. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3875

Categorization

• SEED: An article could explore how the retribution vs. deterrence distinction maps onto moral panics and public reactions to crime — why some wrongs ‘feel’ like they need blood and others only correction.
• XREF: Connects to the moral panic literature in the reading list and to the ‘On Sacrifice’ article’s treatment of retributive violence as stabilizing social order.