Entrenchment analysis must bracket preference formation and judge only barriers to present majority will

Evidence

For the purposes of this Article, however, we will work with a more limited definition of entrenchment. Rather than regarding some kinds of shifts in preferences as creating entrenchment barriers, we shall take individual political preferences, regardless of how they have been shaped or transformed, as given. Furthermore, we shall accept the satisfaction of present majority will—again, “black boxed” with respect to the process of its formation—as a benchmark for well-functioning democracy. Only impediments to giving effect to present majority will, such as supermajority rules for revising statutes or political dynamics like the mobilization of a powerful interest group, will be taken as examples of entrenchment. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 57

Categorization

• XREF: The methodological move of ‘black-boxing’ preference formation mirrors how institutional analysis typically brackets endogenous preference change; relevant to the reader’s modeling choices. — connects to: Learning and adaptive preference shifts under a policy can themselves function as entrenchment — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 56; Policy persistence from popularity is not entrenchment; only nonresponsiveness to preference shifts is — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 51; Blocking formal entrenchment hydraulically increases functional substitutes — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 431 (+3 more)