End-to-end encrypted platforms strip sender metadata, erasing misinformation origins

Evidence

For example, during the Roman era, you often needed certificates from the emperor to be able to use the courier system. Of course, fraud existed then too, but you could at least document and trace the sender of the message. Similarly, the source of the ‘Great Moon Hoax’ was easily identified: the New York Sun. However, unlike Twitter, WhatsApp uses end-to-end encryption, which means that they cannot (or do not) read or moderate user messages. When a WhatsApp message is forwarded, any metadata about the sender is automatically stripped and removed. In other words, WhatsApp does not engage in content moderation and cannot identify the sources of misinformation. — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof, 350

Categorization

• XREF: Contrasts with earlier chapters’ cases where the sender was identifiable — the shift from traceable certifi­cates to cipher­text. — connects to: End-to-end encryption removes any ability to trace misinformation sources. — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof: Why Misinformation Infects…, 350; Anonymous meta-data can be reliably de-anonymized with only three public data points — Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 765
• QUESTION: The contrast between historical traceability of courier systems and modern encryption is a useful through-line worth developing.

Broader Connections

• End-to-end encryption removes any ability to trace misinformation sources. #corroborates (0.90) — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof, 350
• Anonymous meta-data can be reliably de-anonymized with only three public data points #complicates (0.75) — Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 765