Empirical evidence on whether violence breeds violence varies by region and type

Evidence

At best, a moderate relationship tends to turn up, as in Gurr’s work (1968a, p. 1121). Still, Gurr later (1970b, pp. 170, 176–177) strongly argues the “culture-of-violence” hypothesis on “varied evidence and arguments”—which, as I read them, support equally well utilitarian explanations of violence. … In Africa, past rebellions are associated with reduced “turmoil” (Welfling, 1975, p. 887); but Latin America is different, and Western Europe different again. Welfling (with Duvall) squares the circle on the basis of type of collective violence: Turmoil, it is argued, feeds on itself whereas “elitist” kinds of violence reduce the likelihood of later violence. But they do not do so through learning; rather, the cause seems to be the tactical factor of suppression (Duvall & Welfling, 1973, p. 692). Hibbs also reports quite contrary findings for “protest” and “internal war” (1973, pp. 159, 163); in his study, conflict akin to the “elitist” type in Welfling seems to be increased by the existence of a “culture” of violence. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4364

Categorization

• QUESTION: Why would geographic region systematically flip the sign of the past-violence-present-violence relationship? Worth chasing what we now know distinguishes Africa, Latin America, and Western Europe on this.
• XREF: Links to a genuine 1970s methodological literature (Gurr, Hibbs, Welfling) on cross-national political violence that contemporary conflict research has since largely replaced. — connects to: Mass violence evolves progressively from lesser harms rather than erupting suddenly; the MOC “The Violence That Builds: How Modern Order Is Forged, Not Broken, by Force”