Economists had no consensus explanation for the 2008 financial crisis

Evidence

Surprisingly, the financial crisis did not receive much attention at the conference. Many of the sessions on macroeconomics and finance didn’t mention it at all, and when it was finally discussed, the reasons cited for the financial meltdown were all over the map. It was the banks, the Fed, too much regulation, too little regulation, Fannie and Freddie, moral hazard from too-big-to-fail banks, bad and intentionally misleading accounting, irrational exuberance, faulty models, and the ratings agencies. In addition, factors I view as important contributors to the crisis, such as the conditions that allowed troublesome runs on the shadow banking system after regulators let Lehman fail, were hardly mentioned. — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 448

Categorization

• SEED: The scattered, contradictory set of causes cited for the 2008 crash — banks, Fed, too much AND too little regulation, Fannie/Freddie, ratings agencies — is a ready-made taxonomy for an essay on why crises resist single-cause analysis and what that fragmentation enabled politically.
• XREF: connects to: The 2008 crisis invalidated the preceding thirty years of financial orthodoxy — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 133; Neoclassical economics had no framework for deflationary crises — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 158; The Great Moderation consensus collapsed in 2008 exactly as Austrian theory predicted — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 387 (+7 more)

Broader Connections

• Under a dozen prominent economists predicted the 2008 crisis and were ignored #qualifies (0.85) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 683
• Mainstream economists admit failure to predict the crisis but resist overhauling the discipline #expands (0.80) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 517