Economic sanctions against autocratic regimes entrench them rather than topple them

Evidence

In all honesty, however, we must recognize that sanctions against autocratic regimes never work. Look at Iran today. Cuba’s an even better example. A generation-long embargo hasn’t produced a counterrevolution against Castro. In these situations, the pain sanctions inflict is passed on to the people, and the regime is able to entrench its rule through patronage and by diverting the anger of the people onto an external foe. Sanctions are most effective against nations with thriving civil societies who feel the international isolation. This is what happened in South Africa. — Moustafa Bayoumi, How Does It Feel to Be a Problem? Being…, 1207

Categorization

• QUESTION: Worth chasing: does empirical political science on sanctions effectiveness actually support this distinction between autocratic and democratically-leaning targets?
• SEED: An essay angle: the perverse mechanics of sanctions as a regime-consolidation tool — patronage distribution and scapegoating an external foe.
• XREF: connects to: Crimea’s annexation was an easy strategic win immune to Western sanctions — Vincent Bevins, If We Burn: The Mass Protest Decade and…, 520