Early US think-tank debate treated Islam instrumentally, not ideologically

Evidence

It should therefore come as no surprise that these individuals talk to one another and vie for influence within the broader political arena. When they disagree it is typically around strategy or rhetoric; they all share the overall aim of maintaining US hegemony. For instance, back in the 1950s when the Orientalists were arguing that Islam and Communism were incompatible, the newly formed CFR (founded in 1954) took a position against this thesis. … Islam cannot be counted on to serve as such a barrier [to the USSR]. The theory that communism and Soviet influence could never make inroads in the Moslem world because they are materialistic and atheistic has not been borne out. Religion does have a significant place in Middle Eastern society. It colors both popular and official attitudes. But it does not establish absolute immunity to a political virus such as fascism or communism. … In short, CFR offered a realist view of how the United States might maintain its power in the Middle East. This is a difference of strategy, not of goals and outcomes. — Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire, 461

Categorization

  • XREF: Corroborates the thesis that US framing of Islam varies by strategic need, echoing Kumar’s argument cluster against a monolithic ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative. Contrasts with the Orientalist fixity argument. — connects to: The US establishment’s Islamism debate was over strategy, not the goal of hegemony; US policy factions on Islamism differed in strategy, not hegemonic goals — Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of…, 416; US hostility to Islamism depended on whether it served US interests — Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire, 233 (+4 more)
  • ADDENDUM: Supports the ‘Complaints About Immodesty’ and sacrifice essays’ treatment of how empire rhetoric recycles instrumental moral frames; also bears on how elites deploy ideology situationally.

Broader Connections