Domestic courts, not international ones, would enforce world economic law beyond national borders.

Evidence

Like all neoliberals, Tumlir recognized that for the market to exert its salutary discipline, it needed an extra-­economic framework. “The international system of trade and payments as such cannot exercise discipline over sovereign governments in the sense of compelling them to conform in their actions to the system’s rules.” Recall ­here Röpke’s scoffing at the “juridicism” that implied that nations would follow codes set at an international level and litigated at the Hague, the UN, or elsewhere. Tumlir’s solution was dif­fer­ent and more radical—­law would not be conducted between nations but within nations, not at the border but “beyond the border,” as it would become known. The system depended ultimately not on an international effort but on an “active national effort to conform to it and so uphold it.” ­Because “the pres­ent crisis [was] not economic … ​but po­liti­cal,” the judiciary was a means of eluding the interference of demo­cratically elected entities. “The courts are the agency which can bring the internationally-­agreed rules to bear on legislative decisions,” he wrote. Domestic courts, not international courts, would enforce world economic law. Courts offered the necessary wedge and the solution to the “constitutional breach” they themselves had allowed to occur. — Quinn Slobodian, Globalists, 828

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s overall thesis about insulating markets from democracy — Tumlir’s judiciary solution is a direct mechanism for that insulation, matching Hayek’s constitutionalism and the ‘undemocratic’ legalism thread throughout the book.
• DEFINE: Introduces and clarifies the ‘beyond the border’ concept central to this chapter’s argument.