Disturbance predictions must be mechanistic, incorporating history and context

Evidence

The development of theory requires the ability to make predictions. Predictions from first principles, which treat all taxa, ecological systems, or situations as equivalent particles without an accrued history, such as are possible in physics, are not likely to be productive in the study of disturbance. Organisms, communities, populations, and ecosystems vary, have a history, and are subject to the vagaries of climatic and geological background. Thus, the sorts of predictions we can make about disturbance are mechanistic—those that take into account the peculiarities of a particular system and situation. In that context, and considering the evolved or acquired characteristics of the entities involved, meaningful ecological predictions can be made. — S. T. A. Pickett and P. S. White, eds., The Ecology of Natural Disturbance and…, 2242

Categorization

  • XREF: Resonates with the reader’s refrain (from prior books) that ecological science cannot treat systems as physics-equivalent particles — supports the same methodological claim driving their whole polyad. — connects to: Whether an event is a disturbance depends on the receiving organism — S. T. A. Pickett and P. S. White, eds., The Ecology of Natural Disturbance and…, 1030; System structure determines which disturbances matter and their impact thresholds — S. T. A. Pickett and P. S. White, eds., The Ecology of Natural Disturbance and…, 2256; Species responses to cutting reveal their historical disturbance regime — S. T. A. Pickett and P. S. White, eds., The Ecology of Natural Disturbance and…, 263 (+1 more)

Broader Connections