Disconfirming evidence rarely topples deeply held doctrines and worldviews.

Evidence

While it would be a digression to plunge into the bramble thickets of formal epistemology in a book about the crisis, there was at least one major flaw in all these prognostications that needs to be taken into account here. Social psychology, the history and philosophy of science, and the sociology of knowledge all combine to instruct us that people don’t generally behave like that. Only the most ersatz Popperian believer in the awesome power of local falsificationism would begin to presume that some finite observation would immediately impel people to cast their most cherished beliefs into doubt and reconsider long-held ideas that anchor much of their worldview. Such conversions have been known to happen, but they have been few and far between. Predominantly, the long history of schooling, socialization, and past experience induces a stubborn inertia into cognitive processes. More commonly, people react to potential disconfirmation of strongly held views by adjusting their own understandings of the doctrine in question to accommodate the contrary evidence; this has been discussed in the social psychology literature under the rubric of “cognitive dissonance,” and in the philosophy literature as Duhem’s Thesis. — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 94

Categorization

• DEFINE: Pairs cognitive dissonance and Duhem’s Thesis as two parallel treatments of the same human tendency to absorb contrary evidence into an existing framework.
• XREF: Connects to the broader pattern in this book about the Neoliberal Thought Collective’s resilience, and resonates with one earlier highlight about noise and worldview self-defense. — connects to: A belief’s lack of supporting evidence signals how deeply it is held as commonsense — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 2760; Belief systems reject disconfirming evidence rather than revising theories; Lay theorists avoid seeking disconfirming evidence rather than falsifying hypotheses (+11 more)

Broader Connections

• Belief systems reject disconfirming evidence rather than revising theories #corroborates (0.92)
• Even direct evidence of failure cannot shake committed believers’ convictions. #corroborates (0.90) — Holm Gero Hümmler, Ulrike Schiesser, Fact and Prejudice, 130
• Confrontation with contrary evidence can intensify rather than weaken firm belief. #corroborates (0.88) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 97
• Factual hearings rarely shift entrenched public opinion #corroborates (0.85) — Dorothy A. Brown, Getting to Reparations, 1145
• Empirical and historical evidence fails to persuade flat Earth believers #exemplifies (0.82) — Holm Gero Hümmler, Ulrike Schiesser, Fact and Prejudice, 45
• Lay theorists avoid seeking disconfirming evidence rather than falsifying hypotheses #corroborates (0.80)
• A belief’s lack of supporting evidence signals how deeply it is held as commonsense #qualifies (0.75) — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 2760
• Ideological change requires persistence against contrary immediate evidence #expands (0.75) — Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion, 561
• Non-Christians may resist evidence contradicting their beliefs #exemplifies (0.75) — Bob Altemeyer, The Authoritarian Specter, 4168
• Methodological critique can disprove a proof but never disprove a theory #corroborates (0.72) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 642
• Claims without evidence cannot be refuted by counter-evidence. #qualifies (0.70) — Holm Gero Hümmler, Ulrike Schiesser, Fact and Prejudice, 765