Diplomatic concessions to totalitarian regimes intensified rather than moderated their hostility.

Evidence

Many of the errors of the nontotalitarian world in its diplomatic dealings with totalitarian governments (the most conspicuous ones being confidence in the Munich pact with Hitler and the Yalta agreements with Stalin) can clearly be traced to an experience and a common sense which suddenly proved to have lost its grasp on reality. Contrary to all expectations, important concessions and greatly heightened international prestige did not help to reintegrate the totalitarian countries into the comity of nations or induce them to abandon their lying complaint that the whole world had solidly lined up against them. And far from preventing this, diplomatic victories clearly precipitated their recourse to the instruments of violence and resulted in all instances in increased hostility against the powers that had shown themselves willing to compromise. — Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 900

Categorization

• XREF: This cracks open the common-sense assumption that concessions integrate rogue states — sets up the logic later extended to appeasement debates and to whether engagement strengthens or legitimates authoritarian regimes.