Differentiation meant to manage complexity can itself cause information failures
Evidence
The complex institutional dynamics that contributed to the failure among agencies to share vital intelligence information had their origins, ironically, in structural arrangements that were designed to avoid such problems. Structural differentiation, both vertical and horizontal, is one of the most commonly used mechanisms institutional decision makers use to manage informational complexity (Simon, 1981). Unfortunately, one consequence of such differentiation is that critical information—in the form of relevant knowledge and expertise—is necessarily distributed across organizational units. This distribution of knowledge creates what is termed a “transactive memory system” (Moreland, 1999). … Previous research has identified a number of benefits associated with transactive memory systems, especially at the dyadic and small group levels. For instance, the cognitive load for individual decision makers within such a system is reduced because different individuals can remember different information. Moreover, the overall memory system is enhanced because distinctive but complementary forms of expertise can be distributed among the interdependent decision makers. For example, a marital relationship in which the husband manages knowledge pertaining to all of the family’s medical needs and the wife manages knowledge related to the couple’s financial affairs enables each to off-load a substantial set of data that otherwise would have to be stored in memory. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 1996
Categorization
- corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 1996
- XREF: connects to: Differentiation produces the evidence that retroactively justifies itself — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of…, 834; Complex adaptive systems make the pretense of locating an optimal regulatory outcome deeply unwise. — Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental…, 264