Dialectical relationships require a diachronic framework to be articulated

Evidence

Such an extended illustration should serve to underline the inseparable link between what we have called the isolation of the category (the definition of the object of study, whether it be image, style, point of view, character, or those more transitory and unnamed literary phenomena which are the very substance of modern literature itself) and that articulation into a succession of alternative structural realizations which we have called the diachronic sequence or construct, and which, always implied in the very intuition of the category itself, constitutes the concrete working out of the latter by the critic. Thus these two moments stand together as the inaugural gesture of a genuinely dialectical literary criticism, of what we will call its Hegelian mode, to be distinguished later on from the specifically Marxist. — Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, 659 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

The dialectical sublation of temporality in Absolute Knowledge would not have been possible without the teleological and circular Greek time in which one can identify the end and the beginning. Conclusion, the leave: ‘This is a time which can dismiss that other time, the one which does not lie ahead. At the very moment where we believed time had been dismissed, the two times meet and unite.’ — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 166 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Dialectical criticism unites category-isolation with diachronic sequencing. — Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, 659; Greek circular time is the precondition for dialectical sublation of temporality — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 166

Broader Connections

• Dialectical criticism unites category-isolation with diachronic sequencing. #corroborates (0.95) — Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, 659
• Greek circular time is the precondition for dialectical sublation of temporality #expands (0.80) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 166