Deterrence logic can justify seeking more horrific retaliatory weapons.
Evidence
If our problem is to guarantee to an enemy that we have the ability to strike a punitive blow after being struck ourselves—and to assure him that we know that he knows it so that we are under no temptation to doubt the potency of our own deterrence and strike first—we should find virtue in technological discoveries that enhance the anti-population potency of our retaliatory weapons. If it is logical to take measures to guarantee that a larger proportion of our retaliatory forces could survive a first strike on them, the same logic should make us welcome an increase in the potency of those that do survive. As Bernard Brodie has said, “When we consider the special requirements of deterrence, with its emphasis on the punitive aspect of retaliation, we may find a need even for super-dirty bombs. Since the emphasis must be on making certain that the enemy will fear even the smallest number of bombs that might be sent in retaliation, one wants these bombs to be, and thus to appear before the event, as horrendous as possible.” — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 544
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Deterrence amplifies the evolutionary payoff of extreme weapon size. — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 387; Weapon evolution and deterrence form a self-accelerating spiral. — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 390; Releasing soldiers from other tasks lets weapons evolve to extremes — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 128
Related
- Deterrence amplifies the evolutionary payoff of extreme weapon size. (similarity 0.84)
- Weapon evolution and deterrence form a self-accelerating spiral. (similarity 0.84)
- Low-cost bioweapons manufacture destroys the logic of deterrence (similarity 0.83)
- Deterrence rests on surviving retaliation capacity, not on existing destructive capacity. (similarity 0.82)
- Weapons work primarily as deterrents that prevent fights rather than win them (similarity 0.81)
- Weapons designed for first strike destabilize deterrence by inviting preemption. (similarity 0.80)
- Deterrence among animals requires reliable advance prediction of fight outcomes (similarity 0.79)
- Weapons primarily deter rivals rather than inflict harm in actual fights (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Deterrence amplifies the evolutionary payoff of extreme weapon size.
#expands(0.90) — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 387 - Weapon evolution and deterrence form a self-accelerating spiral.
#expands(0.85) — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 390 - Releasing soldiers from other tasks lets weapons evolve to extremes
#expands(0.80) — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 128