Denying a philosopher’s concept of the future doubles as denying that philosophy’s own future

Evidence

Now, whatever else is risked in the undertaking I am beginning here, what I want most of all to avoid is the reactionary, nostalgic tone. The success, the ‘future’, of this approach will depend on its capacity to remain open to those arguments that oppose it. In particular it must remain open to that analysis which claims that the absence of a conception of the future in Hegel implies the absence of a future for the philosophy of Hegel. To say, with Heidegger, that Hegel never speaks about the future amounts to saying that Hegel does not have a future. The present work contests the validity of Heidegger’s assertion, while recognizing what it means and the philosophical concerns it continues to provoke. Against this claim, we affirm that there is indeed a ‘future of Hegel’. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 206

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s enemy/friend MOC thread: the ‘future of Hegel’ is a figure whose heredity and destiny are contested — analogous to how the enemy’s plasticity can be shaped or foreclosed by rival readings.