Delegating to insulated agencies plus international agreements creates double entrenchment

Evidence

Even better, both types of delegation—to domestic agencies and to international decision-making processes—can be combined to create a kind of double entrenchment. This is the story told by Rachel Brewster about the entrenchment of banking regulation. A group of central banks, including the U.S. Federal Reserve, agreed through the Basel Accords to establish minimum capital requirements for banks. From the perspective of the U.S. political process, the requirements contained in the Accords might be viewed as doubly entrenched: set as an initial matter by the Federal Reserve, an insulated political actor, and then entrenched against change by the Federal Reserve itself by the greater political costs of violating international agreements. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 369

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly feeds the reader’s core question: institutional layering across venues (domestic agency + treaty) as a mechanism that compounds stickiness—parallels Milgrom’s multi-layer private-judge systems. — connects to: Entrenchment also works by relocating decision authority to insulated actors — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 325; Electoral and legislative entrenchment form one larger insulating phenomenon — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 41; Entrenchment is intentional creation of legal impediments to change — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 39
  • SEED: An essay angle: ā€˜double entrenchment’ as a generalizable design pattern for why some rationalizing ideologies outlast their founding threat—veto actors stacked at two independent heights rather than one.

Broader Connections