Decentralized regulation rationally pushes states to export pollution across borders

Evidence

Indeed, the more likely scenario is that the decentralized approach, lacking the necessary national and long-term perspective, would prompt the various states to pursue policies that maximize the potential benefits to those within their jurisdiction at the expense of persons and ecosystems in neighboring states. Under such a scheme, generating environmental contaminants would, quite rationally, be located near borders between political jurisdictions so as to maximize the export of environmental risks to other jurisdictions. It is no happenstance when a source of water or air pollution regulated by one state is strategically located or operated so as to send most of its effluent discharge into another neighboring state. — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 188

Categorization

• XREF: Extends the common-pool framing from ch4 — strategic border siting is the concrete manifestation of the cross-boundary common pool problem. — connects to: Local governments close to the environment hold expertise and accountability advantages — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 186; Transboundary environmental problems defeat decentralized local control — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 187; Dispersive pollution alone lets states export harm without degrading their own environment. — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 427 (+1 more)
• recurring: this claim recurs 3 times within its source

Broader Connections

• Transboundary environmental problems defeat decentralized local control #corroborates (0.78) — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 187
• Dispersive pollution alone lets states export harm without degrading their own environment. #qualifies (0.72) — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 427