Data colonialism erodes the rational subject whose autonomy legitimizes law itself

Evidence

There remains, however, a deep paradox that both Julie Cohen and Mireille Hildebrandt note: that practices of data colonialism are potentially eroding the very notion of the rational, reflexive, law-respecting human subject on which the legitimacy of law itself depends. Meanwhile, courts in various countries have become early adopters of algorithmic processing, and much of the power to regulate infringements of autonomy is now delegated to commercial platforms, with dangerous practical and normative implications. In the age of datafication, legal institutions need to defend some version of the principle of autonomy for their own survival. — Nick Couldry & Ulises A. Mejias, The Costs of Connection, 564

Categorization

• XREF: Directly connects to the reading purpose of mapping rival schools: this is the point where the attention/surveillance paradigm (regulation-by-platform) is challenged by the colonialism frame. Also echoes Cohen (Configured) and Hildebrandt’s legal scholarship. — connects to: Resisting data colonialism requires an ecology-of-life frame, not legal regulation — Nick Couldry & Ulises A. Mejias, The Costs of Connection: How Data Is…, 567; Data colonialism may attack the very boundaries of the self. — Nick Couldry & Ulises A. Mejias, The Costs of Connection: How Data Is…, 463
• SEED: Angle: ‘regulatory capture by platform’ — courts adopting algorithmic processing while platform self-regulation erodes the legal subject. Could compare to the attention-economy school’s tacit acceptance of platform mediation.

Broader Connections

• Resisting data colonialism requires an ecology-of-life frame, not legal regulation #responds-to (0.75) — Nick Couldry & Ulises A. Mejias, The Costs of Connection, 567