Credit monopoly underpinned the mafia’s control over growers in Palermo markets

Evidence

As sources multiplied, credit no longer came with the same strings attached. It is now granted sparingly to customers rather than producers and is a means of fostering competition rather than enforcing collusion. Creditors are therefore less inclined to resort to violence against insolvent debtors lest they lose their clients to more benign rivals. The fruit and vegetable marker is now largely competitive. Agents appear more concerned with quality than with establishing or violating collusive deals. The threat of violence seems as remote as in any ordinary business environment. It is tempting, therefore, to conclude that if the mafia ever was involved in the market, it is now no more than a lingering memory. Alas, there are signs that what lingers is rather more substantial. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 560

Categorization

• XREF: Directly maps onto Gambetta’s own private-protection model: violence as enforcement of collusion weakens once competition offers exit options — parallels the borrower-exit logic in the microfinance/law-merchant readings.