Credible religious commitment can be signaled by hard-to-fake involuntary displays

Evidence

One nonabsurd way to resolve the commitment problem is genetically. One who blushes when lying may be able to establish credibility easily without any willful commitment or manufactured disposition. One who does not blush when lying may have to create a reputation for honesty that is worth more than any gain he or she might make from cheating on that reputation. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 617 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Willing martyrdom acts as the ultimate credibility-enhancing display; A non-costly action can still credibly signal sincere belief.; Costly signaling theory cannot explain religious displays without cultural transmission. (+5 more)

Related

• Involuntary signals like blushing solve credibility without willpower (similarity 0.85)

Broader Connections

• Involuntary signals like blushing solve credibility without willpower #exemplifies (0.95) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 617
• Costly displays distinguish sincere believers from fakers #corroborates (0.90)