Courts refuse to invent meaning where an empowered agency has already regulated.

Evidence

“And yet, nowhere in these proceedings has there been suggested any such limitation. We do not conceive it to be our function to choose among the various standards that could be formulated in delineating the right to reject. 1he courts cannot attempt to fill in the interstices of legislation when an administrative agency empowered b’r statute to perform this very function has issued valid regulations. The meaning to be given trade terms is a matter peculiarly within the competence of the administrative agency. Since that agency has exercised its power by issuing regulations, we can seek only to place a reasonable construction upon them, bearing in mind that the parties to this contract have presumably relied upon the regulation in issue.” — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1701

Categorization

• XREF: Core legal-process division of labor between courts and agencies — connects directly to the polyad’s institutions-and-interpretation thread, and to ch19/ch24 notes on agencies fleshing out statutory skeletons. — connects to: Official agencies can regulate private law-making without supplanting it — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 4260; Legislatures cannot resolve all problems alone and depend on other decision agencies. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1716
• DEFINE: The ‘interstices of legislation’ doctrine: when a statute empowers an agency to define terms, courts deem the interstitial gap-filling the agency’s job, not the judiciary’s.