Courts may not let moral condemnation override their limited institutional role

Evidence

“This is a court of law and not a theological institution. However reprehensible young Mr. Reckless’ behavior may seem to the court, it must not allow a merely moral indignation to push it to the point of exercising legislative power.” — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1774

Categorization

• XREF: The institutional-role theme central to this reading: the judge states reasons for holding the moral line against the legislature’s own failure to act, echoing the entire volume’s theory of separated competences. — connects to: Juries may convict of lesser crimes than evidence warrants through sympathy — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1741; Courts should not adjudicate malapportionment despite admitting its unfairness — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3674; Courts won’t punish or reward either side based on moral fault like affairs — Infidelity and Divorce in California: What It Really Means for Your Case (+4 more)
• SEED: An essay angle: how the ‘we are not a theological institution’ refusal — deciding the same repugnant result is allowed because the cure belongs elsewhere — is the signature conservative-liberal move in legal reasoning.
• recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source

Broader Connections

• and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law. American constitutional law can be a profoundly… #expands (0.85)
• Respect for precedent keeps courts from reversing failed policies. #corroborates (0.80) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1482
• Legal rules resting only on past authority deserve condemnation when their rationale has lapsed #complicates (0.75) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 1067