Courts cannot decline to make law because every merits judgment necessarily resolves the dispute

Evidence

But the case also decided something more, did it not, with respect to the rights of the parties to this litigation and of other parties similarly situated? Can a court which enters judgment on the merits ever avoid doing that? Cf. “The possibility of no-law”, p, 396, above. So what was decided must have been a solution of the problem before the Court even though it was not a solution. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1705

Categorization

• recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source
• XREF: connects to: Courts make law only as a byproduct of their adjudicative function — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 15; Refusing to make law itself becomes a lawmaking act with systemic costs — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1873; Courts do make law even though formal theory denies them that power — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 439 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Courts do make law even though formal theory denies them that power #corroborates (0.85) — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 439