Court scheduling shifts the cost of administrative convenience onto defendants’ time.
Evidence
A queuing arrangement that maximizes the costs to citizens at the expense of a relatively small number of street-level bureaucrats is employed by lower courts, which typically require defendants to appear on a given day, but no- … Here they must wait until the judge arrives, and then wait again while the judge gives priority to defendants in the lockup who may require attorneys, defendants whose attorneys plead that they have to be elsewhere, and defendants whose cases require the testimony of waiting police officers, who themselves are subject to other priorities. Only when these and other priorities are accommodated will the docket be called in alphabetical or some other order. — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 708
Categorization
- SEED: Angle: the queue as a hidden tax paid disproportionately by the poor — court docketing as a case study in invisible taxation and its deterrence effects.
- XREF: connects to: ADR programs lower cost, scheduling, and language barriers that deter court users. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2366; Pretrial detention costs defendants jobs, family ties, and defense capacity. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1692; Arrest alone makes defendants pay time and uncertainty costs to the court — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of…, 709 (+3 more)
Broader Connections
- Scheduling systems that routinize agency convenience shift service costs onto the least organized clients.
#corroborates(0.95) — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 697 - Arrest alone makes defendants pay time and uncertainty costs to the court
#expands(0.85) — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 709 - Waiting in courts teaches defendants to abandon legally valid rights.
#expands(0.85) — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 711 - Court delays impose uncounted capital and reputation costs on defaulted dealers.
#exemplifies(0.80) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 158