Cornelius’s neo-Kantianism relativized experience to reject Husserl’s intuition

Evidence

In philosophy he supported one of the many variants of epistemological and psychological neo-Kantianism. What Cornelius claimed to support, freed from all the residues of dogma which were still present in Kant, was a theory of the conditions of possibility of experience, which are rooted in the unity of our consciousness'. By emphasizing the role of perceptual experience, and the part played by the perceiving subject in giving perceptual experience its general validity, he believed he had overcome the mystical element in Husserl's theory of the intuition’ (Erschauen) of states of affairs (Sachverhalte). — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 175 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

This intermediate realm of awareness-of-things, with its immanent transcendence', was criticized by Adorno as being a combination of two abstractions: an abstraction from everything factual, in the concept of originally given phenomena, and an abstraction from the activity of thinking, corporeal individuals, in the concept of consciousness. Husserl had dissociated these abstractions from the things they were abstracted from. What resulted was the reification of abstraction. Consciousness was taking something as given because it had forgotten the part it played in creating it itself. The space in which consciousness and objects apparently coincided was that of reduced consciousness itself. — <cite>Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 2271</cite> (#expands`, via linked claim)

This was a hope that Weber, with his neo-Kantian skepticism about the irreconcilability of practical and theoretical reason, could not hold. Although recognizing the replacement of what he called “substantive” reason by its formal counterpart, Weber was unable to entertain the possibility of its restoration. The “rationalization” of the modern world was meant solely in a nonsubstantive sense. Weber, unlike some of his more romantic contemporaries, did not hope to turn the clock back, but it was clear that he greeted the world’s disenchantment with little enthusiasm. — Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 783 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Cornelius’s neo-Kantianism rejected Husserl’s intuition of states of affairs as mystical — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 175; Husserl’s phenomenology reified abstractions by forgetting consciousness’s productive role — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 2271; Weber’s neo-Kantianism barred him from hoping to restore substantive reason — Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History…, 783

Broader Connections

• Cornelius’s neo-Kantianism rejected Husserl’s intuition of states of affairs as mystical #corroborates (0.97) — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 175
• Husserl’s phenomenology reified abstractions by forgetting consciousness’s productive role #expands (0.75) — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 2271
• Weber’s neo-Kantianism barred him from hoping to restore substantive reason #complicates (0.72) — Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 783