Cornelius’s neo-Kantianism rejected Husserl’s intuition of states of affairs as mystical

Evidence

In philosophy he supported one of the many variants of epistemological and psychological neo-Kantianism. What Cornelius claimed to support, freed from all the residues of dogma which were still present in Kant, was a theory of the conditions of possibility of experience, which are rooted in the unity of our consciousness'. By emphasizing the role of perceptual experience, and the part played by the perceiving subject in giving perceptual experience its general validity, he believed he had overcome the mystical element in Husserl's theory of the intuition’ (Erschauen) of states of affairs (Sachverhalte). — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 175

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Adorno’s dissertation rejected Husserl’s idealism for Cornelius’s immanent philosophy — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 276; Adorno renounced Husserl’s object theory via Cornelius’s pure immanent philosophy — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 276; Cornelius’s neo-Kantianism relativized experience to reject Husserl’s intuition

Broader Connections

• Adorno renounced Husserl’s object theory via Cornelius’s pure immanent philosophy #corroborates (0.85) — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 276