Cooperative equilibria in radio dispatch survive deception only when trust is present

Evidence

If the relative positions of A, B, and X are as represented in the diagram, the game is as follows: if A replies first and tells the truth, say an estimate of ten minutes, B can truthfully claim to be closer and win. If A trusts B, the game is over, and both drivers are willing to cooperate in playing the game again. If driver B replies first and quotes the true time, say five minutes, driver A can either tell the truth and lose or claim a shorter pickup time. In the latter case, if B trusts A, the game is also over despite the lie. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 593

Categorization

• XREF: Formalizes the repeated-game logic that Milgrom uses to show reputation can sustain cooperation - here collapsed by the inability to detect cheaters.