Cooperation fails even when it would benefit all individuals involved.

Evidence

Game theory has provided us with a better understanding of why cooperation may not be forthcoming even when it would benefit most of those involved. As Binmore and Dasgupta put it in their survey of the subject: ‘It is a major and fundamental error to take it for granted that because certain cooperative behaviour will benefit every individual in a group, rational individuals will adopt this behaviour’ (1986: 24). Irrespective of individual rationality and motivation, cooperation may still fail to take place. — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2690

Categorization

• XREF: Directly relevant to the reader’s Luhmann/Hardin analysis — this is the game-theoretic grounding for why observable trust constraints, not rational motives, are what sustain cooperation. — connects to: CDD projects fail even under ideal social-capital conditions, exposing model flaws. — Jessica Carrick-Hagenbarth, Institutional Bricolage and Commoning…, 149; Collective action against inflation fails because individual restraint could serve it equally. — Arthur Borriello and Anton Jäger, The Populist Moment: The Left After the…, 148
• QUESTION: Binmore and Dasgupta 1986 citation worth chasing — the survey that frames the ‘fundamental error’ claim.