Contribution can rest on mutually exclusive liabilities rather than identical common liability

Evidence

But it will be observed also that the principle may be invoked also where the liabilities are not comon either in the sense of being identical in amount or in the sense of flowing from breach of the same kind of duty. All ‘that is necessary is that they be mutually exclusive in the sense that a satisfaction of one is a discharge of the other. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1768

Categorization

• DEFINE: Precisely characterizes the unjust-enrichment basis for contribution: mutual exclusivity of liability, not identity of duty or amount.
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: whether courts adopted this broader mutual-exclusivity reading of contribution after Halcyon, given Judge Swan’s narrower common-liability test.
• XREF: connects to: Strict joint-and-several liability made most Superfund sites effectively indivisible — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 486; Holding one kind of responsibility can shield actors from attribution of the other — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4003

Broader Connections

• Holding one kind of responsibility can shield actors from attribution of the other #expands (0.88) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4003