Contract enforcement replaces rather than constitutes trust between parties

Evidence

If I trust you to act on my behalf, I set myself up for the possibility of disappointment, even severe loss. To avoid that possibility, I might try to find institutional backing to get you to do what I trust you to do. This might be easy to do. For example, if I wish to get you to pay in several installments for the work I do for you or for your purchase of my car, in many societies I can propose that we sign a legally enforceable contract. Now you are faced with the likelihood of real costs if you renege on doing what I have relied on you to do. If the only reason you comply with our agreement is the threat of contract enforcement, then ours is finally not a trust relationship. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 251

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines what trust is not: compliance driven solely by enforceable contracts disqualifies as trust, clarifying the boundary condition of the concept.
• XREF: Directly relevant to the reader’s Hardin integration: trust requires the trustee’s encapsulated interest, not external enforcement — links to Hobbes needing a sovereign because trust alone fails. — connects to: Tammany contracts were favors binding loyalty, not formal agreements — Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the…, 506