Congressional staffing creates a new principal-agent problem between legislators and their experts.

Evidence

Having its own staff as a source of information and ideas unquestionably permits the legislature to assert greater independence of special private groups as well as of the executive. But it creates for the legislator the new problem of the proper relation between himself and the staff. Inevitably, there will be complaints that staff members are attempting to dominate a legislative committee. On the other side, there will be charges that the staff is being used to give an air of reason to results reached on purely political grounds. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 4160

Categorization

• XREF: Parallels the recurring principal-agent and institutional-competence questions across the polyad; staff dependence mirrors the lay-expert and neutral-source problems noted for courts and legislatures. — connects to: Congress delegates because it lacks time and expertise for detail — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 478

Broader Connections

• Congress delegates because it lacks time and expertise for detail #expands (0.78) — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 478