Classical philosophical intuition was the result of methodic analysis, not mysticism
Evidence
What are the criteria for this distinction? On what ground is the status of “truth” assigned to one mode or condition rather than to another? Classical Greek philosophy relies largely on what was later termed (in a rather derogative sense) “intuition,” i.e., a form of cognition in which the object of thought appears clearly as that which it really is (in its essential qualities), and in antagonistic relation to its contingent, immediate situation. Indeed this evidence of intuition is not too different from the Cartesian one. It is not a mysterious faculty of the mind, not a strange immediate experience, nor is it divorced from conceptual analysis. Intuition is rather the (preliminary) terminus of such an analysis—the result of methodic intellectual mediation. As such, it is the mediation of concrete experience. — Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 494
Categorization
- QUESTION: Worth chasing: if intuition is the terminus of conceptual analysis, what does that imply about today’s dismissal of intuition in technical-rational culture?
- XREF: connects to: Reducing philosophy to pure analysis rejects its own generative history; Philosophy’s own conceptual method blocks access to the non-conceptual objects it seeks — Dirk Braunstein, Adorno’s Critique of Political Economy, 1592
Broader Connections
- Reducing philosophy to pure analysis rejects its own generative history
#qualifies(0.72) - Philosophy’s own conceptual method blocks access to the non-conceptual objects it seeks
#complicates(0.72) — Dirk Braunstein, Adorno’s Critique of Political Economy, 1592