Chicago economists allied around common enemies, not shared positive doctrine.

Evidence

The complex network of relationships among Knight, Viner, and Simons reveals that the Chicago economists in this period did not perceive themselves to be part of a coherent group that agreed on any par tic u lar agenda. Their allegiances with one another were attributable more to common intellectual opponents than to an established theoretical or ideological program. — Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion, 115

Categorization

• XREF: This undercuts the later myth of a monolithic ‘Chicago School’; connects to the reader’s knowledge of how intellectual schools get retroactively constructed (compare the Frankfurt School’s own retrospective unity in Wiggershaus). — connects to: Chicago economists led opposition to the New Deal and Keynesian doctrine — Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free…, 88; Early Chicago economists favored regulated capitalism out of skepticism, not market faith. — Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free…, 108; Chicago economists denied ideological uniformity even while conceding nothing post-crisis — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 494 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Chicago economists led opposition to the New Deal and Keynesian doctrine #expands (0.85) — Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion, 88
• Chicago and LSE market advocates were rarely united and often opposed #corroborates (0.85) — Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion, 45
• Early Chicago economists favored regulated capitalism out of skepticism, not market faith. #exemplifies (0.80) — Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion, 108
• Market economists of the 1930s had no shared institution or rhetorical strategy #corroborates (0.80) — Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion, 47
• Chicago economists denied ideological uniformity even while conceding nothing post-crisis #complicates (0.78) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 494