Cheating males erode the reproductive payoff of weapons, capping their evolution

Evidence

To use the same basic equation I allude to in the text, the benefits of having big weapons (B), representing the offspring produced by the females they guard, are offset by production, maintenance, and fighting costs (C). When B − C > 0, then selection drives the evolution of weapons toward ever greater size. What’s not shown is our assumption that males are gleaning 100 percent of the fertilizations of the females they defend: (1 * B) − C > 0. Cheating males erode the rewards to dominant males, so that they reap only a fraction of the sired offspring that they otherwise would have. In the hypothetical beetle example where sneak males, on average, steal one-fourth of the fertilizations, the new equation would be: (0.75 * B) − C > 0. Benefits are devalued by the proportion of fertilizations stolen by cheaters (1 − 0.25 = 0.75). At some point, if cheaters steal enough, the realized benefits may be low enough that they no longer exceed the costs, even for the most successful guarding males. — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 851

Categorization

  • XREF: The cost-benefit balance point and cheater dynamics echo themes in evolutionary game theory and work on cooperation versus defection. — connects to: Extreme skew in mating success drives arms-race escalation in weaponry; Arms races inevitably stall as weapon costs neutralize reproductive benefits — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 432; Successful cheaters can reverse selection so big weapons collapse (+10 more)

Broader Connections