Centralized hierarchical protection rackets are easier for authorities to dismantle.

Evidence

Centralization would make the mafia more secretive and hence stronger but at the same time more fragile: to strike a blow would become harder, but fewer blows could finish it off. The group led by Raffaele Cutolo, for example, which sought to establish itself in the 1970s in Naples through a campaign of aggression apparently failed, owing to excessive centralization relative to its rapid growth in size. Costs soared, and so did defections. Above all, the “pyramidlike structure” of the group facilitated the task of law and order agencies and rival organizations alike (RPMNA: 12). Centralization would also weaken the mafia’s influence on the daily life and business of ordinary Sicilians, a loss for which no increase in purely “military” force could adequately compensate. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 676

Categorization

• XREF: The strength-via-secrecy-but-fragility-via-concentration tradeoff is a classic Schelling-style commitment/coordination point; also parallels the diamond bourse’s reputational-centralization fragility discussed in the reader’s prior reading.