Capability theorists treat well-being as constitutive of human being, not as indicators

Evidence

Nussbaum clearly sees the concept of human well-being in ontological terms: “Here, then, is a sketch of an internal-essentialist proposal, an account of the most important functions of the human being, in terms of which human life is defined” (Nussbaum 1992, 214). She is defining or conceptualizing what it means to be human. She wants to know empirically how human beings and their lives are constituted. She does not want a series of indicators of what it is to be human, but rather a description of the essence of human well-being. Sen makes the same ontological claim: “The claim is that functionings are constitutive of a person’s being, and an evaluation of well-being has to take the form of these constitutive elements” (Sen 1992, 39). — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts and Measurement, 191

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as an example of ontological rather than indicator-based conceptualization.