Calling interpretation ‘discretion’ obscures the deciding officer’s duty to seek the right answer.

Evidence

In these circumstances there may be thought to be a justification for describing the act of interpretation as one of discretion, even within the definition which has been given. But this would be to obscure what seems to be the vital point - namely the effort, and the importance of the effort, of each individual deciding officer to reach what he thinks is the right answer. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 2820

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly relevant to legal-reasoning debates about whether genuine right-answer constraints exist - connects to Dworkinian theory and contrasts with chapter 48’s discretion distinctions. — connects to: Discretion differs by whether the actor must relate reasons across decisions. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
, 2748; Discretion lets a society’s intelligence bear directly on unresolved problems. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
, 2938; Judges test statutory reach by asking how the lawmaker would answer if consulted — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
, 1902 (+3 more)

Broader Connections