Calling interpretation âdiscretionâ obscures the deciding officerâs duty to seek the right answer.
Evidence
In these circumstances there may be thought to be a justification for describing the act of interpretation as one of discretion, even within the definition which has been given. But this would be to obscure what seems to be the vital point - namely the effort, and the importance of the effort, of each individual deciding officer to reach what he thinks is the right answer. â Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 2820
Categorization
- XREF: Directly relevant to legal-reasoning debates about whether genuine right-answer constraints exist - connects to Dworkinian theory and contrasts with chapter 48âs discretion distinctions. â connects to: Discretion differs by whether the actor must relate reasons across decisions. â Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems inâŠ, 2748; Discretion lets a societyâs intelligence bear directly on unresolved problems. â Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems inâŠ, 2938; Judges test statutory reach by asking how the lawmaker would answer if consulted â Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems inâŠ, 1902 (+3 more)
Broader Connections
- Judicial discretion means choosing among alternatives thought equally permissible rather than reasoned elaboration
#contradicts(0.85) â Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 373 - Judicial discretion is channeled by constraints, not eliminated.
#contradicts(0.80) â G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and JudicialâŠ, 188 - Statutory silence on a question delegates discretion to the administrative agency.
#responds-to(0.75) â Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to ClearâŠ, 898