Businessmen and clerics profited from statelessness while advocating order.

Evidence

These religious and business leaders, from time to time in conflict with the local war-lords, were the most powerful and sincere advocates for the restoration of law and order in their own localities, and outside these for the safe and unimpeded transport of their goods. Their commitment to a peaceful, more embracing order, including the restoration of government, was, however, somewhat ambivalent since their own economic motives did not all serve the public interest. The lack of effective government gave them freedom of action to print currency abroad and so manipulate prices to their own advantage, and there were no taxes to pay except those to militia gang leaders. — I.M. Lewis, I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali_ Nation…, 686

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Lewis’s broader argument, developed across the book, that clan-based fragmentation and now business self-interest obstruct state reformation. — connects to: Business-religious elites funded and sheltered the transitional government’s ministers. — I.M. Lewis, I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali_ Nation…, 687; Sheikh Ali and Egal’s anti-constitution campaign weaponized clan identity for patronage gains; Nation-state formation generates founding myths that legitimate ruling-class orders

Related

• Business-religious elites funded and sheltered the transitional government’s ministers. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Business-religious elites funded and sheltered the transitional government’s ministers. #exemplifies (0.80) — I.M. Lewis, I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali_ Nation…, 687
• Nation-state formation generates founding myths that legitimate ruling-class orders #expands (0.70)
• Sheikh Ali and Egal’s anti-constitution campaign weaponized clan identity for patronage gains #complicates (0.30)