Boumedienne rejected attritional frontal attacks on the Morice Line and won by waiting

Evidence

Although the C.N.R.A. had passed a solemn motion declaring that the war would be lost if no reinforcements could be got through to the “interior” in the course of the year, it was not Boumedienne’s intention to follow in the footsteps of those French generals of the First World War. He was not going to let his army of the “exterior” be “bled white” in repeated vain attacks against an almost impregnable Line, against this ideal of a Maginot system which French ingenuity had at last perfected. Boumedienne’s was a calculated risk which external political developments, notably de Gaulle’s peace initiatives, were to vindicate. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1263

Categorization

  • XREF: Parallels the book’s earlier theme of French First World War generals and the Maginot analogy — this inverts it as the FLN learns from French military history. — connects to: The Morice Line cut off the interior Wilayas from all exterior support. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 820; The Morice Line was an electrified, mined, and patrolled barrier across the Tunisian frontier. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 814; The French committed 80,000 of their best troops to defend the Morice Line. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 814 (+1 more)