Both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty demanded a transcendental turn in psychoanalysis.

Evidence

Despite their methodological and ontological diff erences, both Sartre and Merleau- Ponty rejected all naturalistic interpretations of psychoanalysis and argued that psychoanalysis must make a transcendental turn. For Sartre such a turn was made possible by fundamental ontology; for Merleau-Ponty it was realizable only with the help of genetic phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception/ Phenomenology of Perception, 145-47/124-27, 184-87/157-60, 199-202/171-73). — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 399

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies the shared project of existential psychoanalysis and where Sartre and Merleau-Ponty each locate the transcendental ground — ontology versus genetic phenomenology.
• XREF: connects to: The Sartre-Merleau-Ponty break mirrored the earlier Husserl-Heidegger schism — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 836

Broader Connections

• The Sartre-Merleau-Ponty break mirrored the earlier Husserl-Heidegger schism #complicates (0.75) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 836