Bogus peer consensus durably shifts racial attitudes via conformity, not accuracy motives.

Evidence

Although Allport thought that the combined influence of extrafamilial pressure (e.g., peer groups, social institutions, and mass media) might sway prejudiced people’s opinions, he underestimated the power of social consensus as a force for change. Recent research suggests that changing the perception of social norms (to create consensus) can result in immediate and long-lasting changes in prejudice. Stangor, Sechrist, and Jost (2001a, 2001b) had White/European American students first indicate their beliefs about positive and negative stereotypes of African Americans, and then estimate the beliefs of fellow students at their university. One week later, they provided participants with (false) information indicating that, according to research, they had either underor over-estimated the prejudice of their peers. Because of a (bogus) “computer error,” the students were told their initial data had been lost and were asked to report their racial beliefs again. As expected, participants attitudes moved substantially in the direction of the bogus social consensus information – becoming either more positive or more negative toward African Americans depending on what the local consensus was said to be. These changes were strong and persisted for up to two weeks (Stangor et al., 2001b). — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1915 (#expands, via linked claim)

Allport argued that conformity is the primary source of prejudice. We agree. However, he may have underestimated the power of social consensus as a basis for prejudice; most of people’s prejudices are acquired from the local social norms and the culture in which people live. In addition, the manipulation of social consensus and social norms has been shown to be a powerful means by which to reduce prejudice. There is still much to learn about how to wield this normative power for reducing prejudice. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1938 (#complicates, via linked claim)

To avoid social censure, racially prejudiced Whites may express falsely tolerant attitudes. Some claim that even the lower levels of prejudice expressed by highly educated Whites merely reflect sophisticated dissembling, not greater tolerance (Jackman & Muha, 1984). — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 2171 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Highlander-style peer education shifts activists’ worldview only through indirect experiential methods, not direct assertion.; Bogus peer consensus information shifts people’s reported racial attitudes — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 1915; Changing perceived social consensus shifts racial prejudice strongly and persistently — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1915 (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• Bogus peer consensus information shifts people’s reported racial attitudes #expands (0.95) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1915
• Social consensus, not just conformity, underlies most acquired prejudice #complicates (0.80) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1938
• Falsely tolerant attitudes mask enduring racial prejudice. #complicates (0.75) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 2171