Beauvoir argues women’s oppression exceeds Hegel’s Slave because they never transcend immanence

Evidence

Beauvoir argues that women have been enclosed within a sphere of immanence and complicity with men, which has eff ectively precluded their participation in any struggle for recognition, let alone any “fi ght to the death!” In this sense, their historic situation is not comparable to the position of Hegel’s Slave. In fact, although Beauvoir does not explicitly make this point, a woman may be potentially more disadvantaged and oppressed than Hegel’s Slave, since she has never had the opportunity to transcend her situation and become the “essential consciousness” who, on the Sartrean model, lives “for-herself” (pour soi). — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 270

Categorization

• XREF: Connects Beauvoir’s implicit argument to Sartre’s pour-soi/en-soi vocabulary and to the author’s own reading of Hegel’s Master-Slave dialectic. — connects to: Beauvoir repurposes the Hegelian dialectic to analyze women’s historic oppression — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 262; Beauvoir’s The Second Sex applied existentialist method to the history of patriarchy — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 666; Hegel’s Master-Slave dialectic is a literary motif, not a description of actual slavery — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 270

Broader Connections

• Beauvoir repurposes the Hegelian dialectic to analyze women’s historic oppression #expands (0.95) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 262
• Beauvoir’s The Second Sex applied existentialist method to the history of patriarchy #corroborates (0.85) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 666