Beauvoir’s moral arguments for willing others’ freedom predate Sartre’s

Evidence

Sartre clearly announces in L’Existentialisme est un humanisme that an authentic moral agent wills the freedom of others, but he simply states this claim without furnishing an explanation. In Pyrrhus and Cinéas— a treatise written two years prior to Sartre’s lecture “Existentialism Is a Humanism” in 1945—Beauvoir provides at least four arguments in favor of an existentialist moral imperative to support the freedom of others. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 578

Categorization

• XREF: Central evidence for the reader’s influence-direction investigation: Beauvoir supplied arguments two years before Sartre’s bare assertion. — connects to: Beauvoir’s early ethics treats freedom as necessarily directed toward others — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 76; Sartre’s late Hope Now ideas emerged from Beauvoir’s notion of reciprocal self-abandon — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 156; Beauvoir founded her ethics on willing effective freedom for all others — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 479 (+4 more)
• QUESTION: Do the four arguments in Pyrrhus and Cinéas show up later absorbed into Sartre’s ethics, and does Sartre’s lecture acknowledge her?

Broader Connections

• Sartre only considered generosity in ethics after Beauvoir’s influence #corroborates (0.88) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 501
• Beauvoir’s ethical freedom departs from Sartre’s ontological freedom to make morality possible #expands (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 610
• Sartre’s freedom model subordinates others while Beauvoir’s requires affirming their freedom #corroborates (0.82) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 633