Beauvoir’s interdependence ethic overlaps with Sartre’s own considered view

Evidence

Th us, Kruks is mistaken when she quotes from Th e Ethics of Ambiguity to evidence Beauvoir’s departure from Sartre. Th e claim that “it is this interdependence [of freedoms] which explains why oppression is possible and why it is hateful” (EA, 82)22 does not depart in any signifi - cant way from Sartre’s considered view. In fact, Beauvoir affi rms this in her 1955 essay “Merleau-Ponty and Pseudo- Sartreanism,” which defends Sartre against Merleau-Ponty. In that essay, she argues that Sartre developed a notion of interdependence in Being and Nothingness, and she off ers the following quote as evidence: Th e fact of the Other is incontestable and touches me to the heart. I realize him through uneasiness; through him I am perpetually in danger in a world which is this world and which nevertheless I can only glimpse. (EN, 319)23 Th is quote comes aft er the keyhole example and before the quote given above that my being is fundamentally dependent upon Others, such that, to use Sartre’s admittedly overly dramatized language, I am a slave. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 173

Categorization

• XREF: Directly engages the historiographical debate on authorship/influence; Kruks is one pole of that debate. — connects to: Beauvoir viewed her work and Sartre’s as one combined intellectual enterprise — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 50; Beauvoir’s embodiment views diverged from Sartre’s from the start — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 119; Sartre’s late Hope Now ideas emerged from Beauvoir’s notion of reciprocal self-abandon — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 156 (+8 more)

Broader Connections

• Beauvoir’s ethics derive moral obligations from interdependent transcendence #expands (0.92) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 578
• Beauvoir’s ontological freedom position may not depart significantly from Sartre’s #corroborates (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 212
• Beauvoir’s ethical freedom departs from Sartre’s ontological freedom to make morality possible #qualifies (0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 610
• Sartre only considered generosity in ethics after Beauvoir’s influence #expands (0.78) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 501