Beauvoir’s ethical freedom departs from Sartre’s ontological freedom to make morality possible

Evidence

In recent years, Simone de Beauvoir scholars have been at pains to point out that by emphasizing the notion of situated freedom and by distinguishing an ethical freedom apart from Sartre’s ontological freedom, Beauvoir lays a groundwork for an existentialist ethics where Sartre does not. For Sartre, human beings are always free within a given situation to choose our course of conduct and impose an interpretation or an attitude upon our situation; ontologically, the slave is as free as his master and can choose an authentic response to his objectifi cation. In shift - ing away from radical Sartrean freedom, Beauvoir argues at the outset of Th e Ethics of Ambiguity that if freedom is identifi ed with the pure nothingness of subjectivity and all human beings are inescapably free, it becomes senseless to speak of moral failures to act freely or to promote the freedom of others (EA, 26; 24–32). — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 610

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly engages the Beauvoir-Sartre authorship/influence question at the heart of this book’s stated purpose. — connects to: Beauvoir’s situated account of freedom moved Sartre beyond his earlier absolutism — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 46; Beauvoir’s early ethics treats freedom as necessarily directed toward others — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 76; Beauvoir’s interdependence ethic overlaps with Sartre’s own considered view — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 173 (+9 more)
  • DEFINE: Distinguishes ‘situated/ethical freedom’ from Sartre’s ‘ontological freedom’.

Broader Connections