Beauvoir’s ethic of treating others as freedoms parallels Kant’s humanity formula
Evidence
Beauvoir formulates the intersubjective requirement for justifi cation as a principle in the following way: “Th e precept will be to treat the other as a freedom so that his end may be freedom” (EA, 142; MA, 206). If my activities deny the possibility of Others taking freedom as their end, it treats Others not as people but as mere instruments; consequently, Others cannot freely support my project as valuable, and hence it cannot be authentically justifi ed. “Th e supreme end at which man must aim is his freedom, which alone is capable of establishing the value of every end” (EA, 113; MA, 162–63). When put like this, Beauvoir’s principle sounds very much like Kant’s humanity formulation of the categorical imperative: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.” — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 202
Categorization
- XREF: Connects Beauvoir’s intersubjective freedom principle to Kant’s categorical imperative and contemporary Kantians like Korsgaard — useful for Continental/Anglo bridge in moral theory. — connects to: Horkheimer’s Kant studies taught him individuality’s value and the unity of knowledge and ethics — Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History…, 198; Beauvoir’s ethics derive moral obligations from interdependent transcendence — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 578; Beauvoir holds that individual freedom is realized only through being directed at other existences — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 659 (+3 more)
- DEFINE: Defines Beauvoir’s core ethical precept (treat other as a freedom so his end may be freedom) and locates it relative to Kant.
Broader Connections
- Beauvoir holds that individual freedom is realized only through being directed at other existences
#expands(0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 659 - Beauvoir’s ethics derive moral obligations from interdependent transcendence
#complicates(0.75) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 578